Motivated by problems that arise in computing degrees of belief, we consider the problem of computing asymptotic conditional probabilities for rst-order sentences. Given rst-order sentences ' and , we consider the structures with domain f1; : : : ; N g that satisfy , and compute the fraction of them in which ' is true. We then consider what happens to this fraction as N gets large. This extends the work on 0-1 laws that considers the limiting probability of rst-order sentences, by considering asymptotic conditional probabilities. As shown by Liogon'ki Lio69], if there is a non-unary predicate symbol in the vocabulary, asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist. We extend this result to show that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist for any reasonable notion of limit. Liogon'ki also showed that the problem of deciding whether the limit exists is undecidable. We analyze the complexity of three problems with respect to this limit: deciding whether it is well-de ned, whether it exists, and whether it lies in some nontrivial interval. Matching upper and lower bounds are given for all three problems, showing them to be highly undecidable.
Introduction
Suppose we have a sentence expressing facts that are known to be true, and another sentence ' whose truth is uncertain. Our knowledge is often insu cient to determine the truth of ': both ' and its negation may be consistent with . In such cases, it can be useful to assign a probability to ', based on . One important application of this idea|indeed, the one that has provided most of our motivation|is in the domain of decision theory and arti cial intelligence. Consider an agent (or expert system) whose knowledge consists of some facts , who would like to assign a degree of belief to a particular statement '. For example, a doctor may want to assign a degree of belief to the hypothesis that a patient has a particular illness, based on the symptoms exhibited by the patient together with general information about symptoms and diseases. Since the actions the agent takes may depend crucially on this value, we would like techniques for computing degrees of belief in a principled manner.
The di culty of de ning a principled technique for computing the probability of ' given , and then actually computing that probability, depends in part on the language and logic being considered. In decision theory, applications often demand the ability to express statistical knowledge (for instance, correlations between symptoms and diseases) as well as rst-order knowledge. Work in the eld of 0-1 laws (which, as discussed below, is closely related to our own) has examined some higher-order logics as well as rst-order logic. Nevertheless, the pure rst-order case is still di cult, and is important because it provides a foundation for all extensions. In this paper and in GHK93] we address the problem of computing conditional probabilities in the rst-order case. In a companion paper GHK94], we consider the case of statistical knowledge.
The general problem of assigning probabilities to rst-order sentences has been well studied (cf. Gai60, Gai64] ). In this paper, we investigate two speci c formalisms for computing probabilities, based on the same basic approach. The approach is based on an old idea, that goes back to Laplace Lap20]. It is essentially an application of what has been called the principle of insu cient reason Kri86] or the principle of indi erence Key21] . The idea is to assign equal degree of belief to all basic \situations" consistent with the known facts. The two formalisms we consider di er only in how they interpret \situation". We discuss this in more detail below.
In many applications, including the one of most interest to us, it makes sense to consider nite domains only. In the rst-order case, our approach essentially generalizes the methods used in the work on 0-1 laws to the case of conditional probabilities. (See Compton's overview Com88] for an introduction to this work.) Assume, without loss of generality, that the domain is f1; : : :; Ng for some natural number N. As we said above, we consider two notions of \situation". In the random-worlds method, the possible situations are all the worlds, or rstorder models, with domain f1; : : :; Ng that satisfy the constraints . Based on the principle of indi erence, we assume that all worlds are equally likely. In order to assign a probability to ', we therefore simply compute the fraction of them in which the sentence ' is true. The random-worlds approach views each individual in f1; : : :; Ng as having a distinct name (even though the name may not correspond to any constant in the vocabulary). Thus, two worlds that are isomorphic with respect to the symbols in the vocabulary are still treated as distinct situations. In some cases, however, we may believe that all relevant distinctions are captured by our vocabulary, and that isomorphic worlds are not truly distinct. The random-structures method attempts to capture this intuition by considering a situation to be a structure|an isomorphism class of worlds. This corresponds to assuming that individuals are distinguishable only if they di er with respect to properties de nable by the language. As before, we assign a probability to ' by computing the fraction of the structures that satisfy ' among those structures that satisfy . 1 Since we are computing probabilities over nite models, we have assumed that the domain is f1; : : :; Ng for some N. However, we often do not know the precise domain size N. In many cases, we know only that N is large. We therefore estimate the probability of ' given by the asymptotic limit, as N grows to in nity, of this probability over models of size N.
Precisely the same de nitions of asymptotic probability are used in the context of 0-1 laws for rst-order logic, but without allowing arbitrary prior information . The original 0-1 law, proved independently by Glebski et al. GKLT69] and Fagin Fag76] , states that the asymptotic probability of any rst-order sentence ' with no constant or function symbols is either 0 or 1.
Intuitively, such a sentence is true in almost all nite structures, or in almost none. Interestingly, this 0-1 law holds under both the random-worlds and the random-structures methods; in fact, both approaches lead to the same asymptotic probability in this case Fag77] .
Our work di ers from the original work on 0-1 laws in two respects. The rst is relatively minor: we need to allow the use of constant symbols in ', as they are necessary when discussing individuals (such as patients). Although this is a minor change, it is worth observing that it has a signi cant impact: It is easy to see that once we allow constant symbols, the asymptotic probability of a sentence ' is no longer either 0 or 1; for example, the asymptotic probability of P(c) is 1 2 . Moreover, once we allow constant symbols, the asymptotic probability under random worlds and under random structures need not be the same. The more signi cant di erence, however, is that we are interested in the asymptotic conditional probability of ', given some prior knowledge . That is, we want the probability of ' over the class of nite structures de ned by .
Some work has already been done on aspects of this question. Fagin Fag76] and Liogon'ki Lio69] independently showed that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not necessarily converge to any limit. Subsequently, 0-1 laws were proved for special classes of rst-order structures (such as graphs, tournaments, partial orders, etc.; see the overview paper Com88] for details and further references). In many cases, the classes considered could be de ned in terms of rst-order constraints. Thus, these results can be viewed as special cases of the problem that we are interested in: computing asymptotic conditional probabilities relative to structures satisfying the constraints of a knowledge base. Lynch Lyn85] showed that, for the random-worlds method, asymptotic probabilities exist for rst-order sentences involving unary functions, although there is no 0-1 law. (Recall that the original 0-1 result is speci cally for rst-order logic without function symbols.) This can also be viewed as a special case of an asymptotic conditional probability for rst-order logic without functions, since we can replace the unary functions by binary predicates, and condition on the fact that they are functions.
The most comprehensive work on this problem is the work of Liogon'ki Lio69]. 2 In addition to pointing out that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not exist in general, he shows that it is undecidable whether such a probability exists. He then investigates the special case of conditioning on formulas involving unary predicates only (but no equality). In this case, he proves that the asymptotic conditional probability does exist and can be e ectively computed, even if the left side of the conditional has predicates of arbitrary arity and equality.
We extend the results of Lio69] in a number of ways. We rst show, in Section 3, that under any standard weakening of the concept of limit, asymptotic conditional probabilities still do not exist. We de ne three independent questions related to the asymptotic conditional probability: deciding whether it is well-de ned (i.e., is there an in nite sequence of probabilities to take the limit over); deciding whether it exists, given that it is well-de ned; and computing or approximating it, given that it exists. We show in Section 4 that all three problems are undecidable, and precisely characterize the degree of their undecidability. These results continue to hold for many quite restrictive sublanguages of rst-order logic. We then present one \positive" result: In perhaps the most restrictive sublanguage that is still of any interest, if there is a xed, nite vocabulary, and the quanti er depths of ' and are bounded, there is a linear time algorithm that computes the asymptotic conditional probability of ' given . Moreover, for each xed vocabulary and xed bound on quanti er depth, we can construct a nite set of algorithms, one of which is guaranteed to be one that solves the problem. However, it follows from our undecidability results that we cannot tell which algorithm is the correct one. So even this result holds no real promise. In a companion paper GHK93], we extend Liogon'ki 's results for the case of conditioning on unary formulas. This special case turns out to be quite important for our application; see GHK94, BGHK92, BGHK93].
Our undecidability results are of more than purely technical interest. The random-worlds method is of considerable theoretical and practical importance. We have already mentioned its relevance to computing degrees of belief. There are well-known results from physics that show the close connection between the random-worlds method and maximum entropy Jay78]; some formalization of similar results, but in a framework that is closer to that of the current paper, can be found in PV89, GHK94]. Essentially, the results say that in certain cases the asymptotic probability can be computed using maximum entropy methods. 3 Given the wide use of maximum entropy, and its justi cation in terms of the randomworlds method, our results showing that it is not as widely applicable as one might hope come as somewhat of a surprise. Indeed, the di culties of using the method once we move to non-unary predicates seem not to have been fully appreciated. In retrospect, this is not that hard to explain; in almost all applications where maximum entropy has been used (and where its application can be best justi ed in terms of the random-worlds method) the database is described in terms of unary predicates (or, equivalently, unary functions with a nite range). For example, in physics applications we are interested in such predicates as quantum state (see DD85] ). Similarly, AI applications and expert systems Che83] typically use only unary predicates such as symptoms and diseases.
It is interesting to note that in Car52], where Carnap considers a continuum of methods for inductive reasoning (which includes the random-worlds method and a variant of the randomstructures method), he considers only the unary case for all of them, without any comment or justi cation. He does provide some justi cation in Car50], as well as expressing concern that the case of non-unary predicates may cause di culties (although he presents no technical justi cation for this claim):
: : : the bulk of our inductive logic will deal only with properties of individuals i.e., unary predicates], not with relations between individuals, except for those relations which are de ned on the basis of properties. At the present time, this restriction seems natural and well justi ed, in view of the fact that deductive logic took more than two thousand years from its start with Aristotle to the rst logic of relations (De Morgan, 1860). Inductive logic : : : is only a few hundred years old. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that so far nobody has made an attempt to apply it to relations. : : : The inclusion of relations in deductive logic causes obviously a certain increase in complexity. The corresponding increase in complexity for inductive logic is very much greater. Carnap's allusion to the di culty of adding relations to deductive logic is perhaps the observation| known at the time|that while rst-order logic over a vocabulary with only unary predicate symbols is decidable, it becomes undecidable when we add non-unary predicates DG79, Lew79]. The fact that there is an increase in complexity in inductive logic when we add non-unary predicates is not substantiated by Carnap, other than by the observation that very di cult combinatorial questions arise. As our results show, Carnap's concern about the di culty of doing inductive reasoning with relations (non-unary predicates) is well founded.
Asymptotic conditional probabilities
Let be a set of of predicate and function symbols, and let L( ) (resp., L ? ( )) denote the set of rst-order sentences over with equality (resp., without equality). For the purpose of this paper, we assume that is nite. We discuss the possibility of an in nite vocabulary in GHK93]; it turns out that there are various ways to extend the relevant concepts to the in nite case, but that, for generally trivial reasons, all the results in this paper hold under any of these de nitions. Therefore it is su cient to work with the simplifying assumption of niteness.
The random-worlds method
We begin by de ning the random-worlds, or labeled, method. Given a sentence 2 L( ), let #world N ( ) be the number of worlds ( rst-order models) over with domain f1; : : :; Ng in which is true. Since is nite, so is #world N ( ). We de ne Based on this proposition, we omit reference to in Pr w; N ('j ), writing Pr w N ('j ) instead. We would like to de ne Pr w 1 ('j ) as the limit lim N!1 Pr w N ('j ). However, we must rst deal with a technical problem in this de nition: we must decide what to do if #world N ( ) = 0, so that Pr w N ('j ) is not well-de ned. Liogon'ki simply takes Pr w N ('j ) = 1=2 in this case; we take a somewhat more re ned approach here.
It might seem reasonable to say that the asymptotic probability is not well-de ned if #world N ( ) = 0 for in nitely many N. However, suppose that is a sentence that is satis able only when N is even and, for even N, '^ holds in one third of the models of . In this case, we might want to say that there is an asymptotic conditional probability of 1=3, even though #world N ( ) = 0 for in nitely many N. Thus, we actually consider two notions: the persistent limit, denoted 32Pr w 1 ('j ), and the intermittent limit, denoted 23Pr w 1 ('j ) (the pre xes stand for the temporal logic representation of the persistence and intermittence properties MP92]). In either case, we say that the limiting probability is either not well-de ned, does not exist, or is some number between 0 or 1. The only di erence between the two notions lies in when the limiting probability is taken to be well-de ned. This di erence is made precise in the following de nition.
De nition 2.2: Let N( ) denote the set fN : #world N ( ) 6 = 0g. The asymptotic conditional probability 32Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned if N( ) contains all but nitely many N's; 23Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned if N( ) is in nite. If the asymptotic probability 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) is well-de ned, then we take 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) to denote lim N!1;N2N( ) Pr w N ('j ).
Remark 2.3:
(a) If 32Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned, then so is 23Pr w 1 ('j ). The converse is not necessarily true.
(b) If both 32Pr w 1 ('j ) and 23Pr w 1 ('j ) are well-de ned, then they are equal. 4 It follows from our results in GHK93] that the two notions of limiting probability coincide if we restrict to unary predicates or to languages without equality.
The random-structures method
One way of thinking about the random-worlds method is that it treats each individual in f1; : : :; Ng as having a distinct name or label (even though the name may not actually correspond to any constant in the vocabulary). This intuition explains why two worlds that are completely isomorphic as rst-order structures (i.e., with respect to the symbols in the vocabulary) are nevertheless regarded as distinct worlds and are counted separately. The random-structures method, on the other hand, only counts the number of (unlabeled) this says that worlds that treat the symbols in the language in the same way are \really" the same, and so should only be counted once.
Given a structure S and a sentence 2 L( ), all the worlds in S agree on the truth value they assign to . Therefore, we can say that S satis es (or does not satisfy) . Let #struct N ( ) be the number of structures with domain f1; : : :; Ng over that satisfy . We can proceed, as before, to de ne Pr s;
We de ne the persistent limit, denoted 32Pr s; 1 ('j ), and the intermittent limit, denoted 23Pr s; 1 ('j ), in terms of Pr s; N ('j ), in analogy to the earlier de nitions for random-worlds. It is clear that #world N ( ) = 0 i #struct N ( ) = 0, so that well-de nedness (both persistent and intermittent) is equivalent for the two methods, for any '; . Proposition 2.4: For any '; 2 L( ), 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) is well-de ned i 32Pr s; 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr s; 1 ('j )) is well-de ned.
As the following example shows, for the random-structures method the analogue to Proposition 2.1 does not hold; the value of Pr s; N ('j ), and even the value of the limit, depends on the choice of . This example, together with Proposition 2.1, also demonstrates that the values of conditional probabilities generally di er between the random-worlds method and the random-structures method. By way of contrast, Fagin Fag76] showed that the random-worlds and random-structures methods give the same answers for unconditional probabilities, if we do not have constant or function symbols in the language.
Example 2.5: Consider = fPg for a unary predicate P. Let be 9!x P(x) _ :9x P(x) (where, as usual, \9!" means \exists a unique"), and let ' be 9x P(x). For any domain size N, #struct N ( ) = 2. In one structure, there is exactly one element satisfying P and N ? 1 satisfying :P; in the other, all elements satisfy :P. Therefore, 32Pr s; 1 ('j ) = 1 2 . Now, consider 0 = fP; Qg for a new unary predicate Q. There are 2N structures where there exists an element satisfying P: the element satisfying P may or may not satisfy Q, and of the N ? 1 elements satisfying :P, any number between 0 and N ? 1 may also satisfy Q. On the other hand, there are N + 1 structures where all elements satisfy :P: any number of elements between 0 and N may satisfy Q. Therefore, Pr s; 0 N ('j ) = 2N 3N+1 , and 32Pr s; 0 1 = 2 3 . We know that the asymptotic limit for the random-worlds method will be the same, whether we use or 0 . Using , notice that the single structure where 9!x P(x) is true contains N worlds (corresponding to the choice of element satisfying P), whereas the other possible structure contains only one world. Therefore, Pr w N ('j ) = N N+1 , and 32Pr w 1 ('j ) = 1.
Although the two methods give di erent answers in general, there are important circumstances under which they agree. One particular case which is of interest to us in this paper is the following: Proposition 2.6: If contains at least one non-unary predicate symbol that does not appear in , then 23Pr w 1 ('j ) = 23Pr s; 1 ('j ) :
This proposition is a special case of Corollary 2.7 in GHK93], so we do not prove it here.
Nonexistence results
In this section, we show that the limiting probability 23Pr w 1 ('j ) (and hence 32Pr w 1 ('j )) does not always exist. In fact, for most reasonable concepts of limit (including, for example, the Ces aro limit), there are sentences for which the sequence Pr w N ('j ) does not converge.
Nonexistence for conventional limits
As we mentioned above, the fact that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist is well known.
Theorem 3.1: Lio69, Fag76] Let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol. There exist sentences '; 2 L( ) such that neither 23Pr w 1 ('j ) nor 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., neither 23Pr s; 1 ('j ) nor 32Pr s; 1 ('j )) exists, although both are well-de ned.
Proof: Fagin's proof of this theorem is quite straightforward. Let R be a binary predicate in (although, clearly, any non-unary predicate will do). Using R and equality, it is not hard to construct sentences ' even and ' odd such that:
' even and ' odd both force R to be a symmetric antire exive binary relation that divides the domain elements into pairs, where i; j is a pair precisely when R(i; j). Both ' even and ' odd force each element to be paired up with at most one other element.
' even forces the pairing to be complete; that is, each element is paired up with precisely one domain element. It is clear that ' even is satis able if and only if the domain size is even.
' odd forces the pairing to be almost-complete; that is, all elements but one are perfectly paired. It is clear that ' odd is satis able if and only if the domain size is odd. We then take ' to be ' odd and to be ' even _ ' odd . Clearly, Pr w N ('j ) alternates between 0 and 1 as N increases, and does not approach an asymptotic limit.
Although this shows that the asymptotic limit does not exist in general, a good argument can be made that in this case there is a reasonable degree of belief that one can hold. In the absence of any information about domain size, 1=2 seems the natural answer. Perhaps if we modi ed our de nition of asymptotic probability slightly, we could increase the applicability of our techniques.
There is indeed a reasonable modi cation that will let us assign a degree of belief of 1=2 in this case: we can use the Ces aro limit instead of the conventional limit. 5 The Ces aro limit of a sequence s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : is the conventional limit of the sequence s 1 ; (s 1 + s 2 )=2; (s 1 + s 2 + s 3 )=3; : : :, whose kth element is the average of the rst k elements of the original sequence. It is well known that if the conventional limit exists, then so does the Ces aro limit, and they are equal. However, there are times when the Ces aro limit exists and the conventional limit does not. For example, for a sequence of the form 1; 0; 1; 0; : : : (which, of course, is precisely the sequence that arises in the proof of Theorem 3.1), the conventional limit does not exist, but the Ces aro limit does, and is 1=2.
Unfortunately, we show in Section 3.3 that for any de nition of limit satisfying some very basic restrictions, the limit of the conditional probabilities may not exist. In particular, the Ces aro limit satis es these restrictions; therefore, even for Ces aro limits, the non-existence problem still arises.
Simulating Turing machines
Before we prove the nonexistence theorem, we present the construction on which it is based. All of our lower bounds are also based on this construction. The main idea is the well-known fact that we can use rst-order sentences, interpreted over nite domains, to encode (arbitrarily long) pre xes of the computation of a deterministic Turing machine (see Tra50]). That is, given a Turing machine M, we can de ne a sentence M such that any nite model satisfying M encodes a nite pre x of the computation of M on empty input. The exact construction is fairly standard, but requires many details; we present only an outline here.
The following de nition will turn out to be useful.
De nition 3.2: Let be a formula, and let !(x) be a formula with a single free variable x. We de ne restricted to ! to be the formula 0^ ! , where 0 is a conjunction of formulas !(z) for any constant or free variable z appearing in , and ! is de ned by induction on the structure of formulas as follows: ! = for any atomic formula ,
(8y (y)) ! = 8y(!(y) ) ! (y)). Intuitively, restricted to ! holds if holds on the submodel consisting of the set of elements which satisfy !.
Given a deterministic Turing machine M, we construct M as follows. Think of the computation of M as consisting of a sequence of instantaneous descriptions (IDs), which specify the head position, state, and the contents of (at least) that part of the tape which has been read or written so far. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the jth ID contains exactly the rst j symbols on the tape (padding it with blanks if necessary). The construction uses two binary predicate symbols, H and V , to impose a matching \layered" structure on the elements of a nite domain.
More speci cally, we force the domain to look like a sequence of n layers for some n, where there are exactly j elements in the jth layer for 1 j < n, but the last layer may be \incomplete", and have less than n elements. (This ensures that such a partition of domain elements into layers is possible for any domain size.) We construct each layer separately, by assigning each element a horizontal successor. The horizontal successor of the ith element in the jth layer is the (i + 1)st element in the jth layer. This successor must exist except when i is the last element in the layer (i = j), or j is the last (and possibly incomplete) layer (j = n).
We connect one layer to the next by assigning each element a vertical successor. The vertical successor of the ith element in the jth layer is the ith element in the (j + 1)st layer. This successor must exist except if j is the last layer (j = n), and possibly if j is the next-to-last layer (j = n?1). These two types of successor relationship are captured using H and V : H(x; y) holds i y is the horizontal successor of x, and V (x; y) holds i y is the vertical successor of x. Straightforward assertions in rst-order logic can be used to constrain H and V to have the right properties.
We use the jth layer to encode the jth ID, using unary predicates to encode the contents of each cell in the ID and the state of the machine M. It is straightforward to write a sentence M that ensures that this simulation of the Turing machine starts correctly, and continues according to the rules of M. It follows that there is an exact one-to-one correspondence between nite models of M and nite pre xes of computations of M, as required.
We have assumed that two binary and several unary predicate symbols are available. In fact, it is possible to do all the necessary encoding using only a single binary (or any non-unary) predicate symbol. Because this observation will be important later, we sketch how the extra predicate and constant symbols can be eliminated. First, note that the predicates H and V can be encoded using a single predicate R. Since H holds only between elements on the same layer, and V only between elements on two consecutive layers, we can de ne R(x; y) to mean H(x; y) in the rst case, and V (x; y) in the second (we can construct the sentences so that it is easy to tell whether two elements are on the same layer). Any unary predicate P used in the construction can be eliminated by replacing P(x) with R(c; x) for some special constant symbol c. We then replace M with M restricted to x 6 = c, as in De nition 3.2, thus making the denotation of c a distinguished element which does not participate in the construction of the Turing machine. Finally, it is possible to eliminate the use of constant symbols by using additional variables quanti ed with \exists unique"; we omit details. However, note for future reference that for every constant we eliminate, we increase the quanti er depth of the formula by one.
This construction has another very useful property. First, note that the layered structure imposed by H and V ensures that every domain element plays a unique role (i.e., for each element we can nd a rst-order formula with one free variable which holds of that element and no other). So if we (nontrivially) permute the domain elements in one model, we obtain a di erent (although isomorphic) model. This property has been called rigidity. Rigidity implies that, if the domain size is N, every isomorphism class of worlds satisfying M contains exactly N! worlds. The rst important corollary of this is that, for any ' and such that ) M is valid, Pr s; N ('j ) = Pr w N ('j ). Second, note that any two size N models of M are isomorphic (because the machine M is assumed to be deterministic and thus has a unique computation path when started on the empty input). From this observation and rigidity, we conclude that the number of size N models of M is exactly N!; this fact will also be useful later.
Weaker limits
Fagin's non-existence example in Theorem 3.1 was based on a sequence Pr w N ('j ) that consistently alternated between 0 and 1. We mentioned at the end of Section 3.1 that using the Ces aro limit in place of the conventional limit when computing the limit of this sequence gives us the plausible answer of 1 2 . This may lead us to hope that by replacing the conventional limit in our de nition of asymptotic conditional probability, we can circumvent the nonexistence problem. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It is relatively easy to construct examples that show that even Ces aro limits of the conditional probabilities Pr w N ('j ) do not necessarily converge. In this section, we will prove a far more general theorem. Essentially, the theorem shows that no reasonable notion of limit will ensure convergence in all cases. We begin by describing the general framework that allows us to formalize the notion of \reasonable notion of limit".
The Ces aro limit is only one of many well-studied summability techniques that weaken the conventional de nition of convergence for in nite sequences. These are techniques which try to assign \limits" to sequences that do not converge in the conventional sense. There is a general framework for summability techniques, which we now explain. 6 (See, for example, PS72] for further details.) Let A = (a ij ) be an in nite square matrix; that is, a ij is a (possibly complex) number for each pair of natural numbers i; j. Let (s i ) = s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; : : : be an in nite sequence. Suppose that, for all i, the series P 1 j=1 a ij s j converges, say to sum S i . Then the new sequence (S i ) is called the A-transform of (s i ). The idea is that (S i ) may converge to a limit, even if (s i ) does not. The standard notion of limit can be obtained by taking a ii = 1 and a ij = 0 if i 6 = j. The Ces aro limit can be obtained by taking a ij = 1=i if j i, and a ij = 0 otherwise. Not every transform makes intuitive sense as a weakened notion of convergence. It would seem reasonable to require, at the very least, the following conditions of a matrix transform A.
Computability. There should be a recursive function f such that f(i; j) is the entry a ij of the matrix A. It is di cult to see how we could actually use a transform whose elements could not be e ectively computed.
Regularity. If a sequence converges (in the conventional sense), say to limit`, then the A-transform should exist and converge to`. This ensures that we really do obtain a more general notion of convergence.
The regularity condition has been well studied. The following three conditions are known to . there exists M such that P 1 j=1 ja ij j < M, for all i.
In our setting|where the motivation is assigning degrees of belief|we can give an fairly intuitive interpretation to many regular summability methods. Fix a value for i and suppose that (1) for all j, a ij is real and nonnegative, and (2) P 1 j=1 a ij = 1. Then the sequence a i1 ; a i2 ; : : : can also be viewed as a probability distribution over possible domain sizes. Given that one accepts the basic random-worlds framework for assigning degrees of belief relative to a particular domain size, it seems plausible that P 1 N=1 a iN Pr w N ('j ) should be one's degree of belief in ' given , if the uncertainty about the correct domain size is captured by a i1 ; a i2 ; : : : (and if the probability is de ned for all nite N; we discuss how to relax this below). For example, row i of the Ces aro matrix would be appropriate for someone who knows for certain that there are i or less individuals, but subject to this assigns equal degree of belief to each of the i possibilities. However, no single distribution over the natural numbers seems to accurately model the situation where all we know is that \the domain size is large." For one thing, any distribution gives nonzero probability to particular domain sizes, which seems to involve some commitment to scale. Instead, we can consider a sequence of distributions, such that the degree of belief in any particular domain size tends to zero. These assumptions imply conditions R1{ R3, and therefore su ce to guarantee regularity. Furthermore, they are satis ed by almost all summability transforms considered in the literature.
One subtle problem concerning our application of summability transforms is that some terms in the sequence Pr w N ('j ) (or Pr s; N ('j )) may not exist. Throughout the following, we adopt perhaps the simplest solution to this di culty, which is to apply the transform to the subsequence generated by just those domain sizes for which the probability exists (i.e., for which is satis able).
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section: No summability technique covered by this framework can guarantee convergence for asymptotic conditional probabilities. This is so even if the vocabulary consists of a single binary predicate symbol. Theorem 3.3: Let A be any computable regular matrix transform, and let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol. There exist '; 2 L( ) such that the A-transform of the sequence Pr w N ('j ) (resp., Pr s; N ('j )) exists, but does not converge.
Proof: In the following, let U be a rational number within 0.01 of lim sup i!1 P 1 j=1 ja ij j, i.e., jU ? lim sup i!1 P 1 j=1 ja ij j j < 0:01. We will use U as a parameter to the algorithm we are about to construct. Notice that although the existence of an appropriate U is guaranteed by R3, we may not be able to compute its value. Thus, the proof we are about to give is not necessarily constructive. On the other hand, this is the only nonconstructive aspect of our algorithm. A value for U is computable in many cases of interest (for example, if a ij is nonnegative for all i and j, then we can take U = 1); in these cases, our proof becomes constructive. Let i min be such that whenever i i min , we have P 1 j=1 ja ij j < U + 0:01. Such an i min must exist (because of the way U is de ned); it is not necessarily computable either, but the following does not actually depend on its value (i.e., we only refer to i min when proving that the constructed machine works as required).
We use the value of U in the construction of a three-tape four-head Turing machine M. Tape 2 of M will always (after the rst step) contain an alternating sequence of 0's and 1's. The sentence M is constructed so that nite models of encode partial computations of M, exactly as outlined in Section 3.2. The sentence ' is chosen to be true only in models of where the last element written on tape 2 is 1. Note that, as usual, we can assume that '; M 2 L(fRg) for a binary predicate symbol R.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Suppose b j is the truth value of ' (either 0 or 1) in a domain of size j, and let c i = P 1 j=1 a ij b j . Obviously, the sequence (b j ) is determined by the times at which M writes a new symbol to tape 2. We construct M to guarantee that the sequence (b j ) has appropriately spaced runs of zeros and ones, so that there are in nitely many i where c i is greater than 0:9 and in nitely many i where c i is less than 0:1. This ensures that the sequence (c i ) does not converge.
As we have said, M is a three-tape four-head Turing machine. Heads 1a and 1b read tape 1, head 2 reads tape 2, and head 3 reads tape 3. We assume that any subset of heads can move in the same step. Tape 1 is used for keeping track, in unary, of the number of steps that M has taken so far. Tape 2 contains an alternating sequence of 0's and 1's. As we have indicated, the goal of the rest of the construction will be to ensure that tape 2 is updated at appropriate intervals. Finally, tape 3 is a work tape, used for all necessary calculations. Every fourth step, head 1a writes a 1 at the right end of tape 1, and then moves one step to the right. This is done independently of the operation of the rest of the machine. Thus, if we represent the number written on tape 1 at a certain point as m, the actual number of steps taken by M up to that point is between 4m and 4m + 3. Moreover, if we assume (as we do without loss of generality) that the size of the ith ID of the computation of M is i, then to encode the rst i steps of the computation we need a domain of size i(i + 1)=2 + C, where C is a constant independent of i. In particular, the size of the domain required to encode the pre x of the computation at the point where m is the number on tape 1 is roughly 2m(4m + 1), and is certainly bounded above by 9m 2 and below by 7m 2 for all su ciently large m. We will use these estimates in describing M.
The machine M proceeds in phases; each phase ends by writing a symbol on tape 2. At the completion of phase k, for all k large enough, there will exist some number i k such that c i k < 0:1 if k is even, and c i k > 0:9 if k is odd. Since we will also show that i k+1 > i k , this will prove the theorem.
The rst phase consists of one step; at this step, M writes 0 on tape 2, and head 2 moves to the right. Suppose the kth phase ends with writing a 1 on tape 2. We now describe the (k + 1)st phase. (The description if the kth phase ends with writing a 0 is almost identical, and left to the reader.)
Let n l be the size of the domain required to encode the pre x of the computation up to the end of phase l. Since the value at the end of tape 2 changes only at the end of every phase, and b j is 1 if and only if the last element on tape 2 is 1, b j is 0 for n 1 j < n 2 , b j is 1 for n 2 j < n 3 , and so on. M begins the (k + 1)st phase by copying the number m on tape 1 to tape 3 (the work tape). The copying is done using head 1b (head 1a continues to update the number every fourth step). Suppose the number eventually copied is m k . Clearly, m k will be greater than the number that was on tape 1 in the computation pre x that was encoded by domain size n k . Therefore, n k < 9m 2 k for k su ciently large.
We now get to the heart of the construction, which is the computation of when to next write a value on tape 2. (Note that this value will be a 0, since we want the values to alternate.)
Notice that by R1, R2, and R3 there must be a pair (i ; j ) such that: of i min ) P 1 j=1 ja i j j < U + 0:01. Thus, by part (d) above it follows that P 1 j=j +1 ja i j j < 0:02. Using part (b) and the fact that n k < 9m 2 k , it follows that P n k j=1 ja i j j < 0:01. Now from part (c) we get that P j j=n k +1 a i j > 0:98. If b n k+1 = = b j = 1, then c i = P 1 j=1 a i j b j = P n k j=1 a i j b j + P j j=n k +1 a i j b j + P 1 j=j +1 a i j b j P j j=n k +1 a i j ? P n k j=1 ja i j j ? P 1 j=j +1 ja i j j 0:98 ? 0:01 ? 0:02 > 0:9: Thus, it su ces for M to add the next 0 to tape 2 so as to guarantee that n k+1 > j , since our choice of ' will then guarantee that b n k +1 = = b j = 1. This can be done by waiting to add the 0, until after the number m on tape 1 is such that 7m 2 > j . As we observed above, the size of the domain required to encode the pre x of the computation up to this point is at least 7m 2 . Since this domain size is n k+1 by de nition, it follows that n k+1 j , as desired.
This completes the description of the (k + 1)st phase. We can then take i k+1 = i , and guarantee that c i k+1 > 0:9, as desired. Note that, for every k, i k+1 > m k , and (m k ) is a strictly increasing sequence. Thus, we obtain in nitely many indices i at which c i > 0:9 and in nitely many at which c i < 0:1, as desired.
Since #world fRg N ( ) 6 = 0 for all su ciently large N, this shows that both 23Pr w 1 ('j ) and 32Pr w 1 ('j ) are well-de ned, but their A-transform does not converge. The case of randomstructures follows immediately, because for every N, Pr w N ('j ) is either 0 or 1. Consequently Pr s;fRg N ('j ) has the same value as Pr w N ('j ), and the limiting behavior is the same. We remark that there are a few well-known summability methods which are not, strictly speaking, matrix transforms. Nevertheless, our theorem is applicable to these cases as well (at least, to all cases we are aware of). The best example of this is Abel convergence. A sequence (s j ) is said to be Abel convergent if lim x!1 ? (1 ? x) P 1 j=1 s j x (j?1) exists. This is not a matrix transform, because we must consider all sequences of x that tend to 1. However, consider any particular sequence of rationals that converges to 1, say 1 2 ; 2 3 ; 3 4 ; : : :; i i + 1 ; : : :
We can use these to de ne a matrix variant of the Abel method, by setting
This is regular and computable, and is strictly weaker than the standard Abel method. More precisely, if the Abel limit converges, then so does this matrix transform. Since our theorem shows that this new summability method does not ensure convergence for conditional probabilities, this is automatically also the case for the Abel limit.
Undecidability results
We have seen that asymptotic conditional probabilities do not always exist. We might hope that at least we can easily decide when they do exist, so that we would know when the randomworlds or random-structures method is applicable. As we show in this section, this hope is not realized. In this section, we show the undecidability of several important problems associated with asymptotic conditional probabilities: deciding whether the limit is well-de ned, deciding whether the limit exists, and giving some nontrivial approximation to its value (deciding whether it lies in some non-trivial interval). Liogon'ki Lio69] showed that the problem of computing the asymptotic conditional probability for the random-worlds method is undecidable. He did not consider other problems, nor did he characterize the degree of undecidability of the problem. We analyze the complexity of these problems in terms of the arithmetic hierarchy. This is a hierarchy that extends the notions of r.e. (recursively enumerable) and co-r.e. sets. We brie y review the relevant de nitions here, referring the reader to Rog67, Chapter 14] for further details. Consider a formula in the language of arithmetic (i.e., using 0; 1; +; ) having j free variables. The formula , interpreted over the natural numbers, is said to de ne a recursive set if the set of j-tuples satisfying the formula is a recursive set. We can de ne more complex sets using quanti cation. We de ne a 0 k pre x as a block of quanti ers of the form 9x 1 : : :x h 8y 1 : : :y m : : :, where there are k alternations of quanti ers (but there is no restriction on the number of quanti ers of the same type that appear consecutively). A 0 k pre x is de ned similarly, except that the quanti er block starts with a universal quanti er. A set A of natural numbers is in 0 k if there is a rst-order formula (x) = Q 0 in the language of arithmetic with one free variable x, such that n 2 A i (n) is true, where Q is a 0 k quanti er block and 0 de nes a recursive set. We can similarly de ne what it means for a set to be in 0 k . A set is in 0 1 i it is r.e., and it is in 0 1 i it is co-r.e. The hierarchy is known to be strict; higher levels of the hierarchy correspond problems which are strictly harder (\more undecidable").
We prove the following results for the random worlds method. We later modify the proofs to apply to the random-structures method.
Deciding whether 23Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned is 0 2 -complete. Deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned is 0 2 -complete. Deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) exists is 0 3 -complete, given that the limit is well-de ned.
Deciding whether the limit 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) is in some non-trivial closed interval is 0 2 -complete, given that the limit exists.
The lower bounds all rely on the construction in Section 3.2, and use a xed nite vocabulary, consisting of equality and a single binary predicate. Most of them can, in fact, be translated to a language without equality, at the cost of adding two more binary predicates (see Section 4.4).
Well-de nedness of limit
We start with the problem of deciding if the asymptotic probability is well-de ned; this is certainly a prerequisite for deciding whether the limit exists. Of course, this depends in part on which de nition of well-de nedness we use.
Theorem 4.1: Let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol.
(a) The problem of deciding whether a sentence in L( ) is satis able for in nitely many domain sizes is 0 2 -complete.
(b) The problem of deciding whether a sentence in L( ) is satis able for all but nitely many domain sizes is 0 2 -complete.
Proof: We start with the upper bounds. First observe that the problem of deciding whether a rst-order sentence is satis able in some model with domain size N, for some xed N, is recursive (and with the help of some suitable encoding of formulas as natural numbers, we can encode this problem in the language of arithmetic). Given this, deciding if is satis able in in nitely many domain sizes can be encoded using a 0 2 block: for all N, there exists N 0 > N such that holds in some model of domain size N 0 . Similarly, deciding if is satis able for all but nitely many domain sizes can clearly be encoded using a 0 2 block: there exists N such that for all N 0 > N, holds in some model with domain size N 0 . This proves the upper bounds.
It is well known that the following problem is 2 0 -complete: \Given a Turing machine M, does M halt on in nitely many inputs?", and the dual problem|\Given a Turing machine M, does M halt on only nitely many inputs?"|is 2 0 -complete Rog67, Theorem 13-VIII; Corollary 14-VIII(b)]. We prove the two lower bounds by reducing these problems to intermittent and persistent well-de nedness, respectively. First, given an arbitrary Turing machine M, we e ectively construct another Turing machine M 0 that, when started on empty input, starts simulating the computations of M on all inputs by dovetailing, and enters a special state q s once for each input on which M halts. (We leave details of this construction to the reader.) Let M 0 be the sentence that forces its models to encode pre xes of the computation of M 0 on empty input, as described in Section 3.2, and let ' be the sentence that says, with respect to this encoding, that the last layer is complete, and that M 0 is in state q s in the ID encoded in this last layer. Clearly '^ M 0 is satis able for in nitely many domain sizes N i M halts on in nitely many inputs, while :'^ M 0 is satis able for all but nitely many domain sizes N i M halts on only nitely many inputs. This proves the lower bounds.
Corollary 4.2: Let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol. For '; 2 L( ), the problem of deciding whether 23Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr s; 1 ('j )) is wellde ned is 0 2 -complete, and the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 32Pr s; 1 ('j )) is well-de ned is 0 2 -complete.
Existence of limit
If deciding well-de nedness were the only di culty in computing, then there might still be hope. In many cases, it might be obvious that the sentence we are conditioning on is satis able in all (or, at least, in in nitely many) domain sizes. As we are about to show, the situation is actually much worse. Deciding if the limit exists is even more di cult than deciding well-de nedness; in fact, it is 0 3 -complete. We prove this result by rst showing that the problem of deciding whether an r.e. sequence of rationals converges to 0 is 0 3 -complete.
Theorem 4.3: The problem of deciding whether a recursively enumerable in nite sequence of rational numbers converges to zero is 0 3 -complete.
Proof: The following problem is known to be 0 3 -complete: \Does each of the Turing machines in a given r.e. set of Turing machines diverge on all but nitely many inputs?", where the input to this problem is itself a Turing machine (that generates the encodings for the collection of Turing machines we are asking about). More precisely, taking W x to be the x th r.e. set in some enumeration of r.e. sets (or, equivalently, the inputs on which the x th Turing machine halts, in some enumeration of Turing machines), the set fz : 8y(y 2 W z ) W y niteg is 0 3 -complete.
(The complement of this set is proved to be 0 3 -complete in Theorem 14-XV of Rog67].) For our purposes it is slightly better to consider a variant of this problem, namely \Does each of the Turing machines in a given r.e. set of Turing machines enter some distinguished state, say q s , only nitely many times when started on the empty input?" The two problems are easily seen to be equivalent, in that either one can be e ectively reduced to the other.
The lower-bound is proved by reducing this problem to the question of whether a sequence converges to zero. We assume, without loss of generality, that our Turing machine generator G computes a total function, whose values are encodings of other Turing machines. That is, on input i, it is guaranteed to terminate and produce the ith machine (note that the machines produced by G on di erent inputs are not necessarily distinct). We now de ne H ij to have value 1 if the ith machine generated by G is in state q s on its jth step after being started on empty input, and value 0 otherwise. Note that H ij is a computable function of i, j, and the encoding of G, because we can simulate G to obtain the encoding of the ith machine, then simulate this machine for j steps.
We use the numbers H ij to de ne an r.e. sequence s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : of rational numbers in 0,1], where s k is de ned as 0: H 1k H 2k : : :H kk . The computability of H ij guarantees that this sequence is recursively enumerable. Clearly the sequence s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : converges to 0 i , for all i, the sequence H i1 ; H i2 ; : : : is eventually 0, i.e., there exists n i such that H ij = 0 for all j > n i . But the sequence H i1 ; H i2 ; : : : is eventually 0 i the ith Turing machine reaches q s only nitely often. This proves the lower bound.
For the upper bound, note that the question of whether the limit of s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : exists and equals 0 can be written: \For all M, does there exist N 0 such that for all N > N 0 , js N j < 1=M?"
The unquanti ed part of this question is clearly recursive and can be formulated in the language of arithmetic, while the quanti er block is a 0 3 pre x. The result follows.
Theorem 4.4: Let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol. For sentences '; 2 L( ), the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) exists is 0 3 -complete. The lower bound holds even if we have an oracle that tells us whether the limit is well-de ned and its value if it exists.
Proof: To prove the lower bound, we reduce the problem of deciding if an r.e. sequence of rationals converges to 0 to that of deciding if a particular asymptotic conditional probability exists.
Suppose S is a machine that generates an in nite sequence of rational numbers, s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : .
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the numbers are in 0; 1]; if necessary, a new machine S 0 such that s 0 i = max(1; js i j) is easily constructed which clearly has the same properties with respect to convergence to zero. We also assume that the output is encoded in a special form: a rational value a=b is output on the tape as a sequence of a 1's, followed by (b ? a) 0's, suitably delimited.
Let R be a binary predicate symbol. (Of course, any non-unary predicate will su ce.) We begin by constructing S 2 L(fRg) such that nite models of S correspond naturally to pre xes of computations of S, as described in Section 3.2. Let c be a constant. Let 0 S 2 L(fc; Rg) be the conjunction of S and sentences asserting that, in the computation-pre x of S encoded by the domain, the denotation of c corresponds to a cell in that section of the last complete ID that represents the output. Note that for any xed domain size, 0 S has a + (b ? a) = b times as many models over fc; Rg as S does over fRg, where a=b is the most recent sequence value generated by S in the computation simulated so far. According to our discussion at the end of To complete the reduction, consider a sentence ' that says that the simulated computation has just nished writing another sequence element, and the denotation of c corresponds to a cell in that output containing the symbol 1. Assume that the last sequence element written in the pre x corresponding to domain size N is a=b. Note that if there are models of '^ 0 S of domain size N, then there are in fact a N! such models over fc; Rg (corresponding to the a choices for the denotation of c). In this case Pr w N ('j 0 S ) has value a=b. It follows that the sequence Pr w N ('j 0 S ), for increasing N, is precisely the sequence generated by S interspersed with zeros at domain sizes corresponding to computations that have not just output a new value. Note that both persistent and intermittent limits are well-de ned for this sequence. If this limit exists at all, it must have value zero, and this will be the case just if the sequence generated by S has this property. This proves the lower bound. We remark that the use of an extra constant c is not necessary in our proof; it can be eliminated as discussed in Section 3.2.
To prove the upper bound, note that the question of existence for 23Pr w 1 ('j ) can be stated as: \Is it true that for all integers M, there exist rational numbers r 1 r 2 and integers N 0 and N 1 > M such that for all N N 0 , (1) #world N 1 ( ) 6 = 0, (2) if #world N ( ) 6 = 0, then Pr w N ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ], and (3) r 2 ?r 1 1=M?" The unquanti ed part is clearly recursive, showing that the problem of deciding whether 23Pr w 1 ('j ) exists is in 3 0 . We can state the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) exists as follows: \Is it true that for all integers M, there exist rational numbers r 1 r 2 and an integer N 0 such that for all N N 0 , (1) #world N ( ) 6 = 0, (2) Pr w N ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ], and (3) r 2 ? r 1 1=M?" Thus, the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) exists is also in 0 3 .
Computing the limit
Even if we have an oracle that will tell us whether the conditional probability is well-de ned and whether it exists, it is di cult to compute the asymptotic probability. Indeed, given any nontrivial interval (one not of the form 0; 1]), it is even di cult to tell whether the asymptotic probability is in the interval. Theorem 4.5: Let be a vocabulary containing at least one non-unary predicate symbol, and let r; r 1 ; r 2 2 0; 1] be rational numbers such that r 1 r 2 . For sentences '; 2 L( ), given an oracle for deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) exists, (a) the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) = r (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) = r) is 0 2 -complete, (b) if r 1 ; r 2 ] 6 = 0; 1], then the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ] (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ]) is 0 2 -complete, (c) if r 1 6 = r 2 , then the problem of deciding if 32Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 (r 1 ; r 2 ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 (r 1 ; r 2 )) is 0 2 -complete.
Proof: We start with part (a). Just as with our earlier results, the upper bound is the easier part. This problem can be stated as \For all M, does there exist an N > M such that #world N ( ) > 0, and jPr w N ('j ) ? rj < 1=M ?" It is easy to see that this sentence has the appropriate form for 0 2 . Furthermore, it is true just if there is some subsequence of domain sizes such that the asymptotic probability, when restricted to these sizes, has value r. If the sequence as a whole has any limit at all (and we can check this with the oracle) then this limit must also be r.
To prove the lower bound, we proceed just as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 by reducing the problem \Does a Turing machine reach a speci ed state q s in nitely often?" to the problem of deciding whether the asymptotic probability is r. Let M be an arbitrary Turing machine. As discussed in Section 3.2, we can nd a sentence M 2 L(fRg) such that nite models of M correspond naturally to pre xes of computations of M. Our next step is to construct sentences ' r and r such that Pr w N (' r j r ) = r, for all N. Suppose r = a=b, and choose k such that 2 k > b. We can easily construct propositional formulas r and r using k primitive propositions p 1 ; : : :; p k such that r has exactly b satisfying assignments and r^ r has exactly a satisfying assignments. Let ' r and r be the sentences that result by replacing occurrences of the primitive proposition p i in r or r by P i (c), where P i is a unary predicate symbol, and c is a constant symbol. It is easy to see that Pr w N (' r j r ) = r for all N.
Let Q be a unary predicate not among fP 1 ; : : :; P k g, and let 0 be a sentence asserting that there is exactly one domain element satisfying Q, and that this element corresponds to one of the tape cells representing the head position when the machine is in state q s . De ne to be M^ r^( 0 _8x Q(x)). For any domain size N, let t N denote the number of times the machine has reached q s in the computation so far. The sentence has t N + 1 times as many models over fR; P 1 ; : : :; P k ; Q; cg as the sentence M^ r has over fR; P 1 ; : : :; P k ; cg. We now consider two cases: r < 1 and r = 1. If r < 1, let ' be simply ' r _ (:' r^8 x Q(x)). It is easy to see that Pr w N ('j ) is r + (1 ? r)=(t N + 1). If M reaches q s nitely often, say t 0 times, the limit as N ! 1 is r + (1 ? r)=(t 0 + 1), otherwise the limit is r. The limit always exists, so our oracle is not helpful. This proves the required lower bound if r < 1. If r = 1, then we can take to be M^( 0 _ 8x Q(x)) and ' to be :8x Q(x). In this case, Pr w N ('j ) is t N =(t N + 1); therefore, the limit is 1 if M reaches q s in nitely often, and strictly less than 1 otherwise. Again, the lower bound follows. Note that, as discussed in Section 3.2, we can avoid actually using new unary predicates and constants by encoding them with the binary predicate R.
For part (b), the upper bound follows using much the same arguments as the upper bound for part (a). For the lower bound, we also proceed much as in part (a). Suppose we are given an interval r 1 ; r 2 ] with r 2 < 1, and a Turing machine M. Using the techniques of part (a), we can construct sentences ' and such that 23Pr w 1 ('j ) and 32Pr w 1 ('j ) are both well-de ned, and such the asymptotic probability is r 2 if M reaches state q s in nitely often, and strictly greater than r 2 otherwise. This proves the lower bound in this case. If r 2 = 1, we use similar arguments to construct sentences ' and such that the asymptotic conditional probability is r 1 if M reaches state q s in nitely often, and is strictly less than r 1 otherwise. Again, the lower bound follows.
Finally, for part (c), observe that the asymptotic probability is in (r 1 ; r 2 ) i it is not in 0; r 1 ] r 2 ; 1]. The arguments of part (b) showing that checking whether the asymptotic probability is in a closed interval is 0 2 -complete can be extended without di culty to dealing with the union of two closed intervals. Thus, the problem of deciding whether the asymptotic probability is in an open interval is 0 2 -complete.
It is easy to see that analogues to Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 hold for the random-structures method as well. The upper bounds hold with no change in proof. The same is true for the lower bounds as well, since, as we observed in Section 3.2, the sentences constructed to show that the lower bounds hold are true only in rigid structures (and therefore, random worlds and random structures agree).
Eliminating Equality
At rst glance, it seems that the proofs of all the above results make heavy use of equality. As we now show, we can eliminate the use of equality >from most of these results, at the price of adding two more binary predicate symbols to the vocabulary. Proof: The idea of the proof is somewhat similar to that used in KV90] to eliminate equality.
Let ' and be as in the hypotheses of the theorem. De ne E to be the result of replacing all subformulas of of the form t 1 = t 2 by E(t 1 ; t 2 ); we de ne ' E similarly. Thus, we are using E to represent equality. Let be a conjunction of formulas that force E to be an equivalence relation, as well as a congruence on G and on all symbols in . Thus, a typical conjunct of (which in fact forces E to be a congruence on G) has the form: 8x y z(E(x; y) ) ((G(x; z) , G(y; z))^(G(z; x) , G(z; y)))): Let 0 be E^ , and ' 0 be ' E .
As we now show, there are many more models of 0 of size N where E is true equality than there are where E is some equivalence relation other than equality. To simplify the notation, we write w N instead of #world N ( ). It is easy to see that there are precisely w N 2 N 2 models of size N of 0 over fG; Eg where E is equality: for every model of size N of over , there are 2 N 2 models of 0 , because the choice of G is unrestricted. Now we must get an estimate on the number of models of 0 where E is an equivalence relation, but not equality. It turns out that the crucial factor is the number of equivalence Using Theorem 4.6, we can show analogues to most of our results for the language with equality. First, we can immediately deduce the following corollary to Theorem 3.3.
Corollary 4.7: Let A be any computable regular matrix transform, and let be a vocabulary containing at least three non-unary predicate symbols. There exist '; 2 L( ) such that the A-transform of the sequence Pr w N ('j ) (resp., Pr s; N ('j )) exists, but does not converge.
Proof: It is easy to verify that for the used in the proof of Theorem 3.3, it is indeed the case that #world N ( ) is a non-decreasing function of N.
We now show that similar analogues to most of the complexity results of this section also hold. The exceptions are Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2.
For a language with no equality, 23Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned i 32Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned i is satis able for some model. This is true because if is satis ed in some model of size N, then it is also satis ed in some model of size N 0 for every N 0 > N. As a consequence, we can show:
Theorem 4.8: Let be a vocabulary containing at least two non-unary predicate symbols. For '; 2 L ? ( ), the problem of deciding if 23Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 32Pr w 1 ('j )) is well-de ned is r.e.-complete.
Proof: We can state the problem of deciding whether 23Pr w 1 ('j ) is well-de ned as follows: Does there exist an N > 0 for which #world N ( ) > 0. The unquanti ed part is clearly recursive, thus proving the upper bound. For the lower bound, we proceed as before. For a given Turing machine M, we let M encode a pre x of the computation of M on empty input which is a complete pre x currently in an accepting state. Let E M be the same formula, but with equality replaced by the binary predicate E, as in the proof of Theorem 4.6. Let be the formula forcing E to be an equivalence relation and a congruence on R. The sentence E M^ is satis able in in nitely many domain sizes i it is satis able for some domain size i M halts. Note that we did not need the additional predicate G in this proof.
We now show that the remaining complexity results do carry over. It is clear that all our upper bounds hold trivially for the language without equality. We consider the lower bounds, one by one.
Theorem 4.9: Let be a vocabulary containing at least three non-unary predicate symbols. For sentences '; 2 L ? ( ), the problem of deciding if 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) exists is 0 3 -complete. The lower bound holds even if we have an oracle that tells us whether the limit is well-de ned. However, it is easy to transform S to an equivalent Turing machine S 0 , that outputs the rationals in a non-reduced form satisfying the constraint. Using this transformation, the result follows from Theorem 4.6.
Theorem 4.10: Let be a vocabulary containing at least three binary predicates, and let r; r 1 ; r 2 2 0; 1] be rational numbers such that r 1 r 2 . For sentences '; 2 L ? ( ), given an oracle for deciding if 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j )) exists, (a) the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) = r (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) = r) is 0 2 -complete, (b) if r 1 ; r 2 ] 6 = 0; 1], then the problem of deciding whether 32Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ] (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 r 1 ; r 2 ]) is 0 2 -complete, (c) if r 1 6 = r 2 , then the problem of deciding if 32Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 (r 1 ; r 2 ) (resp., 23Pr w 1 ('j ) 2 (r 1 ; r 2 )) is 0 2 -complete.
Proof: It can be veri ed that the sentences constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.5 satisfy the constraints of Theorem 4.6.
We can trivially obtain analogues to the results in this section for the random-structures method by adding one more binary predicate to the language (not used in the relevant formulas), and using Proposition 2.6. For example, we can show that if contains at least four nonunary predicate symbols, then for '; 2 L ? ( ), the problem of deciding if 32Pr s; 1 ('j ) (or 23Pr s; 1 ('j )) exists is 0 3 -complete. Similar analogues to the other results in that section also hold. Details are left to the reader.
Is there any hope?
These results show that most interesting problems regarding asymptotic probabilities are badly undecidable in general. Are there restricted sublanguages for which these questions become tractable, or at least decidable?
All of our negative results so far depend on having at least one non-unary predicate symbol in the vocabulary. In fact, it clearly su ces to have the non-unary predicate symbols appear only in . However, as we indicated in the introduction, this additional expressive power of is essential. If we restrict to refer only to unary predicates and constants, many of the problems we encounter in the general case disappear. This holds even if ' can refer to arbitrary predicates. In the companion paper GHK93] we focus on this important special case. Here, we consider one other case.
A close look at our proofs in the previous sections shows that we typically started by constructing sentences of low quanti cation depth, that use (among other things) an unbounded number of unary predicates. For example, the original construction of the sentences encoding computations of Turing machines used a unary predicate for every state of the machine. We then explained how to encode everything using only one binary predicate. In the process of doing this encoding, we had to introduce additional quanti ers (for example, an existential quanti er for every unary predicate eliminated). Thus, our undecidability results seem to require one of two things: an unbounded vocabulary (in terms of either the number of predicates or of their arity), or unbounded quanti cation depth. Do we really need both? It is actually easy to show that the answer is yes. time. This is because there exists a constant time algorithm|essentially a lookup table|that, given a formula in d i , outputs the correct response. So, given any formula, we can nd the equivalent formula in d i , and use this algorithm to obtain the appropriate output. Note that we cannot necessarily give an e ective construction that produces the lookup table.
We rst prove the existence of d i for each xed d by induction on i. For the base case i = 0, observe that our assumptions imply that there are only nitely many distinct \literals" consisting of a predicate symbol, followed by the appropriate number of arguments drawn from the constants in and x 1 ; : : :x d . (For the purpose of this proof, we treat equality just like any other binary predicate.) Every formula in L d 0 ( ) is a Boolean combination of these literals, and there are only nitely many non-equivalent Boolean combinations of formulas in a nite set. We can e ectively construct a set d 0 consisting of one representative of each equivalence class of equivalent formulas. For later ease of exposition, we assume that if the equivalence class includes a literal, then that is the representative chosen to be in d 0 .
For the inductive step, suppose that we have constructed d i . Every formula in L d i+1 ( ) is equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Qx j , where j d, has depth at most i, and Q is either 9; 8, or is absent altogether. By the inductive hypothesis, we can replace by an equivalent formula 2 d i . Therefore, every formula in L d i+1 ( ) is equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Qx j , where j d and 2 d i . Since d i is nite and j d, this is a Boolean combination of formulas in a nite set. Using the fact that there are only nitely many inequivalent Boolean combinations of formulas in a nite set, we can again construct a nite set d i+1 extending d i for which the result follows.
To complete the proof, we need to show how to determine the appropriate 2 d i given a sentence 2 L d i ( ). We assume that is fully parenthesized. First, it is clear that there exists a constant time algorithm (a lookup table) such that: given a formula of the form 1^ 2 , : 1 , or 9x j 1 , for 1 ; 2 2 d i , it nds an equivalent formula in d i . This is easy to see because, as d i is nite, there are only a nite number of possible inputs.
We now proceed by reading from left to right, doing the following:
1. push all literals and operators (Boolean connectives and quanti ers) on a stack as they are encountered, 2. when we encounter a right parenthesis, pop the immediately preceding symbols o the stack, so as to obtain a subformula of the form 1^ 2 , : 1 , or 9x j 1 , 3. nd the formula 2 d i which is equivalent to the popped subformula, 4. push back onto the stack.
It is straightforward to prove by induction that in Step 2, the formulas 1 and 2 are both in d i . The base case follows by our assumption about d i containing all literals. The inductive step follows by the construction of the lookup table algorithm. Moreover, the subformula pushed onto the stack in Step 4 is logically equivalent to the formula it replaces. It follows that after is read, there is exactly one formula on the stack, which is equivalent to .
Given and d, it is easy to construct d i and a Turing machine that, for each pair of formulas '; 2 L d i ( ), nds the equivalent formulas ' ; 2 d i . Given that, it remains only to construct a lookup table that tells us, for any formulas ' ; 2 d i , the behavior of 32Pr w 1 ('j ) (23Pr w 1 ('j ), 32Pr s; 1 ('j ), 23Pr s; 1 ('j )). We can easily construct a nite set of linear-time Turing machines, corresponding to the di erent possible lookup tables. One of these will allow us to correctly determine the behavior of the asymptotic probability (wellde nedness, existence, and value of limit).
The proof of the previous theorem says that, for each d, there exist lookup tables that e ectively determine the behavior of the asymptotic probability for sentences in L d ( ). Moreover, it shows that we can e ectively construct a nite set of lookup tables, one of which is bound to be the right one. Unfortunately, we cannot e ectively determine which one is the right one, for if we could, we could e ectively construct M d given and d, and this would contradict our earlier undecidability results. Thus, even for this extremely restrictive sublanguage we cannot e ectively construct algorithms for computing asymptotic conditional probabilities.
